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How can self-locating propositions be integrated into normal patterns of 
belief revision?  Puzzles such as Sleeping Beauty seem to show that such 
propositions lead to violation of ordinary principles for reasoning with 
subjective probability, such as Conditionalization and Reflection.  I show 
that sophisticated forms of Conditionalization and Reflection are not only 
compatible with self-locating propositions, but also indispensable in 
understanding how they can function as evidence in Sleeping Beauty and 
similar cases.   
 
 
1.  Introduction.  A proposition is self-locating if it pertains to my location (hereafter, 
temporal location) in the world.  “Today is Monday” is entirely self-locating:  it adds 
nothing to a complete description of the world beyond my current location.  A 
proposition is substantial if it tells me something about the world.  “Julius Caesar died in 
44 B.C.” is entirely substantial:  it tells me nothing about my current location.  Can a 
proposition be both self-locating and substantial?  If so, how can learning such a 
proposition best be integrated into normal patterns of belief revision? 
In recent years, several puzzles related to these questions have become familiar to 
philosophers, the most notorious being Elga’s Sleeping Beauty problem.  Elga (2000) 
believes in substantial self-locating propositions and thinks that they furnish 
counterexamples to venerable Bayesian principles for reasoning with subjective 
probabilities.  Other philosophers, such as Lewis (2001), are reluctant to give up those 
principles and resist the idea that we can learn anything about the world from self-
locating information.   
This paper offers a framework for thinking about self-locating propositions and 
adjudicating some of the disputes.  I concentrate on Sleeping Beauty and a few variants.  I 
argue that we can accommodate substantial self-locating information with very little 
modification of traditional Bayesian principles.  Rather than overturning those principles, 
puzzles such as Sleeping Beauty confirm their flexibility and viability. 
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2.  The Sleeping Beauty problem.   
Sleeping Beauty (A): 
Between Sunday and Wednesday, an experiment is conducted.  Beauty goes into 
a deep, drug-induced sleep on Sunday night.  A fair coin is tossed.  If the result is 
Heads, Beauty is awakened only at noon on Monday.  If the result is Tails, she is 
awakened at noon both on Monday and on Tuesday.  After each awakening, the 
drug is administered and Beauty goes back to sleep.  The drug causes limited 
amnesia.  When Beauty awakens on Monday or Tuesday, she has no memory of 
anything after Sunday night.  In particular, she has no recollection of previous 
awakenings (if any), and no idea whether it is Monday or Tuesday.  On 
Wednesday, the experiment ends and Beauty goes home. 
Figure 1 depicts the schedule of awakenings. 
Mon Tues 
Heads Awake Not 
awake 
 Tails Awake Awake 
Fig. 1:  Sleeping Beauty 
The Sleeping Beauty problem is this:  upon being awakened but not told which day it is, 
what should be Beauty’s degree of belief (or subjective probability) that the result of the 
coin toss was Heads?   
Everyone agrees that on Sunday, Beauty’s subjective probability for Heads ought 
to be ½, since the coin is fair and Beauty should follow the ‘Principal Principle’ (Lewis 
1980).  Opinion is split about what should happen to Beauty’s probability for Heads 
when she is awakened.  ‘Halfers’ maintain that it stays ½.  ‘Thirders’ think that it should 
drop to 1/3.  By the end of the paper, I conclude that the correct answer is ‘slightly above 
1/3.’   
3.  The argument for ½.  Lewis (2001) maintains that Beauty’s subjective probability 
must remain unchanged at ½.  Beauty learns that she is awake.  Lewis agrees that this is 
new evidence.  Beauty now knows that the disjunction (Monday and Heads) ∨ (Monday 
and Tails) ∨ (Tuesday and Tails) is true, where Monday = “Today is Monday,” and 
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similarly for Tuesday.  That is self-locating or ‘centred’ evidence,1 but Lewis thinks it is 
irrelevant to Beauty’s beliefs about the coin toss.   
Why does Lewis think it is irrelevant?  Not just because it is self-locating.  Lewis 
thinks self-locating evidence can be substantial:  he believes that the ‘centred’ evidence 
Monday should raise Beauty’s subjective probability for Heads above ½.  His distinction 
between relevant and irrelevant self-locating evidence seems to be that the former rules 
out possibilities while the latter rules out nothing.  Beauty’s being awake is compatible 
with either toss result and with either day, so it cannot be relevant.     
For a clearer case of a self-locating proposition that is substantial, consider a 
variation.   
Complementary Sleeping Beauty (B): 
The set-up is as in version A, except that on a result of Heads, Beauty is 
awakened only on Tuesday.  On a result of Tails, Beauty is not awakened at all.  
                                                 
1 See section 4. 
Figure 2 illustrates the schedule of awakenings.
Mon Tues 
Heads Not 
awake 
Awake 
Tails Not 
awake 
Not 
awake 
Fig. 2:  Complementary Sleeping Beauty  
Awakening definitely provides substantial self-locating information.  It both tells Beauty 
that it is Tuesday and increases her probability for Heads to 1.  Self-locating information 
can be substantial—the problem is to sort out when and how.   
4.  The symmetry argument.  Hitchcock (2004) provides an argument for the 1/3 
answer, based upon a theoretical model and two specific theses.  The theoretical model 
consists of a description of the possible outcomes together with a probability function 
that reflects Beauty’s degrees of belief.  The two specific theses are symmetry and 
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independence.  Beauty’s degrees of belief exhibit symmetry with respect to the two 
possible days (Mon or Tues) and probabilistic independence between the current date and 
the result of the coin toss. 
I modify the details of Hitchcock’s argument slightly.  With Lewis and Elga, 
Hitchcock represents Beauty’s situation using Quine’s device of centred worlds:  
possible worlds with individuals-at-times.  Since we are concerned with just one 
individual (Beauty), a centred world is an ordered pair <w, t> where w is a possible world 
and t is a temporal location in w.  If W is the set of all possible worlds and T is the set of 
all possible times, then the set of all centred worlds is just the Cartesian product C = W × 
T,2 representing possible worlds together with possible current locations for Beauty.   
We restrict our attention to cases where W and T are finite.  In Sleeping Beauty, 
the possible worlds can be represented as the two rows in Fig. 1:  Heads and Tails.  The 
possible times consist of the two columns, Mon and Tues.  The set C of centred worlds 
consists of the four combinations represented as squares in Fig. 1.  Each world 
corresponds to an elementary proposition <O, D>, where O is the outcome of the coin 
toss (Heads or Tails) and D is the current day (Mon or Tues). 
Beauty’s degrees of belief (on Monday, but not knowing that it is Monday) are 
represented by a probability function P defined over disjunctions of these elementary 
propositions.  P is defined by attaching a probability to each elementary proposition, and 
that is where the two theses come into play.   
Symmetry is the assumption that P(Mon) = P(Tues) = ½.  Hitchcock suggests we 
may appeal to symmetry, “in the absence of any information favouring one day of the 
week over the others” (409).  These probabilities do not take into account the information 
that Beauty has been awakened.  They rest upon Beauty’s appreciation of the 
experimental set-up.  They represent beliefs that she ought to hold if she could be polled 
in her sleep, just before awakening.   
Independence is the assumption that D and O are independent.  There is no 
correlation between the current date and the result of the coin toss.  It helps to think of 
independence as holding right up to the moment before Beauty is awakened.  Hitchcock 
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writes:  “if she were given the information that it is Monday while sleeping, this should 
not affect her subjective probability that the coin landed heads.” 
From these assumptions, together with the unproblematic P(Heads) = P(Tails) = 
½, it follows that each of the elementary propositions <Heads, Mon>, <Tails, Mon>, etc. 
has probability ¼.  Given the schedule represented in Fig. 1, where A stands for an 
awakening, we have P(A / <Heads, Mon>) = P(A / <Tails, Mon>) = P(A / <Tails, Tues>) 
= 1, while P(A / <Heads, Tues>) = 0.  It follows at once that P(Heads / A) = 1/3.  Note 
also that P(Heads / ~A) = 1:  if Beauty could somehow be made aware in her sleep that 
no awakening has taken place, she would conclude that the coin toss resulted in Heads.   
5.  Two objections.  I believe that the preceding argument is decisive, with only a minor 
modification related to the symmetry assumption (see section 9).  By contrast, Hitchcock 
raises two objections that lead him to conclude that the symmetry argument is only 
“suggestive”.   
The first is that the argument requires us to attribute “funny” subjective 
probabilities to Beauty.  The probabilities P(Mon) = P(Tues) = ½ and P(Heads / ~A) = 1 
are funny because, given our interpretation of P as Beauty’s degree of belief, they 
correspond to degrees of belief that Beauty could never actually have.  We want P(Mon) 
and P(Tues) to refer to degrees of belief that Beauty has just before she awakens, but at 
that time Beauty lacks the capacity to have degrees of belief.  Also, P(Heads / ~A) 
requires conditionalization on a proposition that Beauty could never learn, namely, that 
she did not awaken.  The concern, then, is that these subjective probabilities are 
meaningless.   
 Hitchcock’s second (and more serious) objection is that we lack a convincing 
reason for thinking that conditionalization is the correct way to model how we assimilate 
self-locating information.  Yet the symmetry argument depends upon conditionalization 
on a self-locating proposition.  So a crucial step is unjustified. 
Why should conditionalization on a newly learned self-locating proposition be a 
problem?  Hitchcock points out that belief change due to ‘learning’ such propositions 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Simplifying assumption:  the set of possible times is the same (or isomorphic) across worlds.  This is fine 
for problems like Sleeping Beauty, where possible worlds do not vary in spatio-temporal structure. 
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may violate conditionalization.  I currently believe with probability 1 the proposition 
Mon, ‘today is Monday.’  Upon awakening tomorrow, my probability for Mon drops 
from 1 to 0, while my probability for Tues jumps from 0 to 1.  Such changes violate 
conditionalization.  Thus, we cannot readily equate learning a self-locating proposition 
with updating our beliefs via conditionalization.   
 Of course, a similar point applies to most propositions upon which we 
conditionalize.  Such propositions are typically assigned probability 1 as the result of 
direct observation (the coin lands Heads) or direct action (I accept such-and-such a bet), 
not conditionalization.  Self-locating information is acquired in a direct manner, but that 
hardly precludes its use in conditionalization.   
 There are, however, some legitimate concerns.  The first pertains to the fickle or 
non-cumulative nature of self-locating evidence.  P(Mon) rises to 1 and then drops to 0.  
That never happens with ordinary propositions upon which we conditionalize.  If E is to 
count as evidence, we might expect that it should obey the following principle: 
Stability of Evidence.  If Pt(E) = 1, then Pt′ (E) = 1 for times t′ later than t (barring 
cognitive malfunction).   
A second, closely related concern is representing subsequent changes in terms of 
conditionalization.  What happens to Beauty’s degrees of belief on Wednesday, when she 
goes home?  Here are four possible experimental protocols: 
Protocol #1:  Beauty remembers everything.  She must then assign probability 1 
either to Heads or to Tails (depending on what happened on Tuesday).   
Protocol #2:  Beauty remembers nothing.  She reverts to probability ½ for Heads.   
Protocol #3:  Beauty remembers just one randomly selected day, but it happens to 
be a day when she was awakened.  The probability for Heads remains 1/3. 
Protocol #4 (the default protocol):  Beauty remembers only Monday.  Her 
subjective probability for Heads reverts to ½.  (This also holds if Beauty 
remembers only the last day on which she was awake.)   
Focus on protocol #4.  If the initial move to probability 1/3 for Heads (on Monday) is the 
result of conditionalization, the return to ½ must be due to conditionalization on new 
information (received on Wednesday).  But it is difficult to see how this can be. 
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Conditionalizing upon self-locating information, in short, appears to raise many 
questions.  Nevertheless, I argue in section 7 that we can model Beauty’s changing 
probabilities as successive cases of conditionalization.   
6.  The first objection.  Hitchcock’s “funny” subjective probabilities are a concern only 
because, in Sleeping Beauty, we cannot separate the capacity for having certain 
subjective probabilities from the news or information that leads to belief revision.  
Beauty’s awakening does double duty.  It both enables her to have degrees of belief and 
functions as a signal that leads to belief change.  This is a distracting feature of the 
scenario rather than a serious problem.  
Consider the situation of Beauty’s younger sister, Cutie. 
Sleeping Cutie (C):   
Cutie undergoes a similar experiment, but is awakened on both days at 9 a.m.  If 
the result of the coin toss was Heads, a chime sounds at noon on Monday only.  If 
the result was Tails, a chime sounds at noon on both Monday and Tuesday.  
Shortly after noon, Cutie goes back to sleep.  Like Beauty, she has no memory of 
previous awakenings.  Cutie’s problem is to come up with a value for 
P(Heads / Chime). 
 
Here is the picture:   
  Mon Tues 
Heads Chime No 
Chime 
Tails Chime Chime 
Figure 3:  Sleeping Cutie 
The early awakening allows Cutie to have degrees of belief, represented by P.  
Hitchcock’s first objection does not apply because P(Mon), P(Tues) and P(Heads / No 
chime) cease to be “funny”.  The first two correspond to degrees of belief that Cutie can 
and should have between 9 a.m. and 12 noon.  The third is meaningful because (pace 
Hitchcock’s second objection) Cutie can update by conditionalization on whether the 
chime sounds at noon.  If it sounds, we have P(Heads / Chime) = 1/3.   
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 Other than eliminating Hitchcock’s first objection, Sleeping Cutie is not 
relevantly different from Sleeping Beauty.  We can transform one into the other in three 
steps. 
Step 1:  Let Cutie sleep in.   
Let Cutie be awakened close to noon—indeed, precisely at noon, just as the 
chime sounds (or fails to sound).   
At the limit of a noon awakening, the probabilities P(Mon) and P(Tues) cease to be 
subjective degrees of belief that Cutie can actually have.  The continuity argument shows 
that this is unimportant.  Cutie accepts P(Mon) = P(Tues) = ½ because had she been 
awakened one second earlier, she would have held those degrees of belief.   
Subjective probability is not precisely the same as actual degree of belief.  As van 
Fraassen (1984) points out, sometimes the conditional probability P(X / Y) “is not to be 
thought of as the probability we would accord X should we learn that Y”.  It may be that 
Y is not a proposition that we can ever come to believe.  A similar comment applies to 
prior probabilities that we could never have.  Even though Cutie sleeps in, P represents 
her understanding of the set-up, unchanged from Sunday night.   
Step 2:  Make the chime an alarm clock.   
Don’t wake Cutie at all if the chime does not sound.   
This step makes no difference to Cutie’s subjective probabilities for the three cases out of 
four where she is awakened.  The priors are unchanged.  The policy about when to sound 
the chime is unchanged.  Her being awake or not provides no information beyond that 
given by the chime.   
Step 3:  Dispense with the chime. 
It doesn’t matter what mechanism is used to awaken Cutie.  All that matters is 
that she is awakened deliberately according to a prescribed schedule.  So we can dispense 
with the chime, which makes Cutie’s case identical to that of Beauty.  Accordingly, there 
is no loss of generality if we focus on Sleeping Cutie when we turn to Hitchcock’s second 
objection. 
 9
7.  The second objection:  conditionalization and product measures.  Cutie 
conditionalizes her probability for Heads on whether or not the chime sounds.  My main 
claim in this section is that it is perfectly in order to update our beliefs about entirely 
substantial propositions by conditionalizing on self-locating information.  If A is an 
entirely substantial proposition (such as Heads) and E is newly acquired self-locating 
information (such as Chime), then it is appropriate to shift our degree of belief from P(A) 
to P(A / E).   
In order to defend this claim, I first sharpen the symmetry argument by taking a 
closer look at the probability measure P on the set of centred possible worlds and the 
nature of conditionalization.  As in section 4, let us represent the set of centred worlds for 
Cutie as C = W × T, where W = {Heads, Tails} and T = {Mon, Tues}.  The natural choice 
for Cutie’s subjective probability function is the product measure P = PW × PT, where PW 
and PT are probability functions for W and T.  If A ⊆ W and B ⊆ T, then P(A × B) = PW(A) 
⋅ PT(B).  P is then defined (additively) over finite unions of such rectangles.   
The product measure comes with the built-in assumption of independence 
between entirely self-locating propositions and entirely substantial propositions.  
Independence is the correct way to formalize the idea that we can learn nothing from 
(entirely) self-locating information.  Such information changes only PT, not PW, and can 
make no difference to our substantial beliefs.  Let A be entirely substantial, i.e., a subset 
of W.  Write P(A) for P(A × T).  Then  
P(A) = PW(A) ⋅ PT(T) = PW(A), 
so a change to PT makes no difference to P(A).  Contrary to Lewis, learning that it is 
Monday can have no effect on Cutie’s probability for Heads.3   
Turn now to conditionalization with the product measure.  Let A be an entirely 
substantial proposition, such as Heads.  Let E be new evidence.  Then conditionalization 
applied to the product measure gives: 
                                                 
3 By the same token, losing information that is entirely self-locating makes no difference to the subjective 
probability for Heads.  So even if, as Monton (2002) has argued, Beauty forgets which day it is between 
Sunday and Monday, that type of forgetting cannot explain her shift in probability for Heads. 
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This formula can be applied to any sort of evidence E at all.  In particular, we can apply it 
to Sleeping Cutie.  The evidence E she gets (on Monday) is Chime, which amounts to 
<Heads, Mon> ∨ <Tails, Mon> ∨ <Tails, Tues>.  Here, A is the proposition Heads and T 
is {Mon, Tues}.  Given that our other assumptions entail that each elementary proposition 
has probability ¼, we have  
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= 1/3. 
To conditionalize on Chime is simply to remove the top right box in Fig. 3 and distribute 
the probability over the remaining L-shaped region.  
Subsequent conditionalization on further evidence is no problem.  We give Cutie 
the additional information E′ that it is Monday.  She conditionalizes again to obtain 
P(Heads / E′ and E) = P(Heads / E′) = ½.  The new information removes the bottom right 
box in Fig. 3.   
The objections described in section 5, however, pertain to diachronic updating—
changes in belief between Sunday and Monday, or between Monday and Wednesday.  
Instead of P, we should speak of Pt, the probability on day t.  Cutie’s subjective 
probabilities change during the day, but they also change from day to day.  Can 
diachronic updating be represented by conditionalization on self-locating propositions? 
 Our first concern was that evidence should remain evidence, yet self-locating 
propositions appear to be ephemeral:  they pass from impossible to certain and then back 
to impossible.  In fact, barring memory loss, self-locating evidence is as permanent as any 
other sort of evidence!  Granted, the self-locating proposition “today is Monday” is true 
on day t (Monday) and false on Wednesday.  But the evidence Mont, that on day t it was 
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Monday, remains evidence on Wednesday (assuming the default protocol).  Cutie might 
say:  “that day I remember was Monday.”  Similarly, on Wednesday, Cutie still has the 
evidence Chimet that the chime sounded on that remembered day.   
Remembered evidence Et about time t remains evidence.  At t (in fact, Monday), 
Cutie hears the chime and conditionalizes as above to obtain Pt(Heads / Chimet) = 1/3.  If 
t′ is the next remembered day after t, then for any entirely substantial proposition A, I 
suggest 
 (2) Pt′(A) = Pt(A / Et)  
where Et is the total information obtained on day t.   
 Acquiring centred evidence about the past time t (at later time t′) is equivalent to 
acquiring the centred evidence at t.  On Wednesday, Cutie learns Mont:  the day she 
remembers was Monday.  Conditionalization on this information is no more problematic 
than if she acquires that information on Monday.  The reasoning leads to probability ½ 
for Heads.  If she learns that the remembered day was Tuesday, she can conditionalize on 
Tuest to obtain probability 1 for Tails (since she already has the evidence Chimet).  And 
so on.  Any possible change in Cutie’s probability for Heads between Monday and 
Wednesday can be accounted for by conditionalization on new centred evidence about 
the past, provided she retains her memories of Monday.   
This takes care of successive conditionalization, which was the second concern 
identified in section 5.  Conditionalization on self-locating information is unproblematic, 
provided that the self-locating information is time-indexed and the object of 
conditionalization is an entirely substantial proposition.   
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8.  Reflection.  The 1/3 answer seems to violate standards of rationality.  First consider 
the Sunday-Monday shift:  Beauty foresees that her subjective probability for Heads will 
be 1/3 on Monday, but insists on assigning ½ on Sunday.  Second, consider the Monday-
Wednesday shift:  Beauty foresees a change to ½ on Wednesday (assuming the default 
protocol), but insists on 1/3 on Monday.  She twice refuses to take her foreseeable future 
beliefs as authoritative, despite acknowledging the rationality of the policy that leads to 
those beliefs. 
The relevant ‘standards of rationality’ are van Fraassen’s Reflection principles.  
General Reflection states: 
(GR) My current opinion about event E must lie in the range spanned by the 
possible opinions I may come to have about E at later time t, as far as my present 
opinion is concerned.  (1995, 16) 
For a person with sharp numerical subjective probabilities, General Reflection entails the 
Special Reflection Principle: 
(SR1) P(A / Pt(A) = x) = x,  
where Pt stands for my subjective probability function at that later time t.  More 
generally, if I am sure that I will have some precise probability for A at t,  
(SR2) ∑ =⋅=
x
t xAPPxAP ))(()( ;   
P(A) is my expectation value for Pt(A) (1995, 19).   
The Sunday-Monday and Monday-Wednesday shifts clash with the Reflection 
principles.  Yet in both cases, Beauty is right not to follow those principles because of her 
uncertainty about her location on Monday.  As Hitchcock (2004) observes, an agent 
cannot be convicted of an irrational belief revision policy if the policy exhibits no 
internal inconsistency, but only a clash between the agent’s internal beliefs and 
(inaccessible) outside information.  From the outside, Beauty’s degree of belief for Heads 
upon awakening is too low on Monday and too high on Tuesday.  But that proves nothing 
about the rationality of her belief revision policy.  Still, rather than rejecting Reflection, I 
propose a modest revision.  
Let us say that our situation at t is classical if we are certain about our location:  
Pt(T=t) = 1.  It is non-classical if there are times t1, …, tn such that Pt(T=ti) = pi > 0 for 
each ti, p1 + … + pn = 1, and t is one of t1,…,tn.  Call {t1,…, tn} the orbit of t.  The values 
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pi need not be equal, but the same values p1,…,pn must be assigned to Pti(T=t1),…, 
Pti(T=tn) for each ti.  Otherwise, we could use our current subjective probability 
assignments to rule out some of the times in the orbit of t.   
The two Reflection Principles should be modified when either the present or 
future time (or both) in the comparison is non-classical.  Suppose first that at t0 I foresee 
a non-classical period.  Let t range over possible future times t1, t2,…, tn in that period, 
and let pi > 0 be the probability that I will assign at each such time to t=ti.  Restricting our 
attention to substantial propositions A, I suggest the following Reflection principles. 
1.  GRL (General Reflection with uncertain location):   
For any time t, my current probability for A must lie in the range spanned by the 
probabilities I may have for A at any time in the orbit of t, as far as my present 
opinion is concerned.   
The entire orbit (rather than any single day) is authoritative for the present.  In normal 
cases, this reduces to the familiar principle of General Reflection.  For Sleeping Beauty, 
GRL implies that Beauty’s probability for Heads on Sunday must lie in the range 
spanned by 1/3 and 1 (since 1 = P(Heads / not Awake) is a potential subjective 
probability4), which it does. 
2.  SRL (Special Reflection with uncertain location):   
For any future time t, P(A / pt1(A)=x & … & ptn(A)=x) = x, if t1,…, tn are the times 
I deem possible at t. [P is my current subjective probability.] 
More generally, 
∑∑ =⋅=
x
t
i
i xAPPxpAP i ))(()( , 
where pi = Pt(t=ti), the prior probability that t=ti.  That is, we take the weighted 
sum of the expectation of A at each time that I deem possible. 
 
The formula reduces to ordinary Special Reflection in normal cases.  For Sleeping 
Beauty, we have p1 = p2 = ½ and 
P(Heads) = ½ (1/3) + ½ ([½ ⋅ 1/3 + ½ ⋅ 1]) =  ½,  
the correct value for Sunday.  This takes care of the Sunday-Monday transition. 
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What of the Monday-Wednesday transition?  Here, Beauty’s uncertainty is about 
her present temporal location t rather than the future location t*=Wednesday.  She knows 
that on Wednesday, she will get centred information leading to a subjective probability of 
½ for Heads, but that information might not be about t (it might be Tuesday)!  Told that 
t=Monday, she will regard Wednesday as authoritative; told that t=Tuesday, she will 
ignore Wednesday and assign probability 0 to Heads.  Special Reflection here takes the 
form of a linear combination of these two cases, weighted by her current (posterior) 
probabilities for the possible values of t:   
0)()( ⋅+⋅= ∗ TuestMont pAPpAP , 
where t is the present moment and t* is Wednesday.  Since pMon=2/3 and Pt*(A) = ½, we 
get Pt(Heads) = (2/3)(1/2) = 1/3.   
 I do not offer a completely general version of Reflection.  It is enough to see, first, 
that the Monday-Wednesday shift can be represented as an instance of Reflection, and 
second, that we only gain full insight into the rationality of that shift when we do so 
represent it.  Reflection makes us smarter.  Rather than leading us to reject Reflection, 
Sleeping Beauty should lead to increased respect for this guiding principle. 
9.  Symmetry revisited.  Bostrom (2006) asks us to consider another case.  
Extreme Sleeping Beauty (D): 
If the toss results in Heads, Beauty is awakened only on day one.  If the toss 
results in Tails, Beauty is awakened on one million consecutive days!  As usual, 
she has no memory of prior awakenings and no idea what day it is.  What should 
be her probability for Heads when she awakens?   
Employing the symmetry argument, we get 
001,000,1
1 .  That, says Bostrom, is highly 
implausible.   
This objection signals a problem with the symmetry assumption.  Both Hitchcock 
and Elga appeal to the Principle of Indifference in arguing that all days are equally 
probable.  Hitchcock notes “the absence of any information favouring one day of the 
week over the others,” while Elga notes that Monday and Tuesday are “subjectively 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Recall the discussion of subjective probability vs. degree of belief in section 7. 
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indistinguishable” (after a result of Tails).  Yet we have reason to assign unequal prior 
probability to the days in Extreme Sleeping Beauty.  Though subjectively identical, the 
days are not exactly alike simply because some are much closer to the beginning of the 
experiment.  Before the experiment begins, Beauty knows that she may become ill, the 
scientists may get bored, or something else might put a halt to the proceedings.  Her 
subjective probability that things will carry on for the full million days could be 
miniscule.  Symmetry is not compulsory! 
 Suppose that Beauty thinks that there is a small (constant) chance, p, that the 
experiment will end each night, and pn+1 = (1 – p)pn is the relation between the prior 
probabilities of days n and n+1.  Then P(Heads / Awake) works out to approximately p 
for a sufficiently long experiment.  If p = 1/100, then Beauty’s degree of belief in Heads 
on being awakened is also around 1/100.  This might not satisfy Bostrom but it provides a 
helpful reality check. 
Even in the original Sleeping Beauty problem, we need not accept perfect 
symmetry between Monday and Tuesday.  This observation is philosophically important 
even though the impact on Beauty’s numerical probabilities is slight.5  If P(Mon) is 
slightly larger than P(Tues), then P(H / Awake) ends up slightly larger than 1/3.  The 
significant point here is that independence (of day and coin toss result) does the real work 
in justifying Beauty’s shift in probability for Heads away from ½.  Symmetry, or lack of 
symmetry, simply drives that new subjective probability closer to either 1/3 or ½.   
                                                 
5 One philosophical implication:  Hitchcock notes that his DDB argument compels us to accept P(Mon) = 
P(Tues) = ½, which (if the present claims about symmetry are correct) counts against that argument.   
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10.  Conclusion.  A proper understanding of the role of self-locating propositions in 
belief revision is essential for a resolution of Sleeping Beauty.  Such propositions are 
only problematic if they are the object of the belief being updated.  Provided we put them 
in their place, as evidence used to update an entirely substantial belief, we can 
accommodate them using sophisticated forms of conditionalization and Reflection. 
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